Graduate
Center CUNY organized yesterday (April 26) a star-studded discussion of the
effects of trade on US jobs and wages. The participants were David Autor and
Ann Harrison, both authors of seminal economic papers on the effects of China’s
imports on US employment and wages (and professors at respectively MIT and
Wharton), Brad DeLong, a polymath and former high Treasury official in Clinton’s
administration (and professor at Berkeley), and Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize
winner, professor at the Graduate Center CUNY, and probably one of the three most
influential economists in the world.
The
discussion was started by David Autor who pointed out that although US
manufacturing employment was on a downward trend since 1943 (when it accounted
for almost 40% of the labor force), what happened in the early 2000s with China’s
accession to the WTO was a sharp (“off-the-cliff”) decrease in the number of
manufacturing jobs. Between the late 1990s and today some 5 million manufacturing
jobs were lost. While Autor thought that technological change was indeed a big factor
explaining longer term trends the most recent drop cannot be dissociated from
trade (import penetration from China).
Next, in the
opening statements, Ann Harrison, referring to two very important papers which
she coauthored, argued that the effects of
trade are visible when one follows workers by occupation much more than when
one looks simply at a given industry. Thus, people displaced by trade, even
if they ultimately get reemployed, lose some 25% of their wage. The second paper of Ann Harrison carries a possibly slightly different message: many jobs
were lost because capital goods became cheaper, and machines thus substituted
for labor. It is a technology story with a twist: technological change responded
to the change in relative prices. Harrison said that her position on the
technology-trade (TT) debate is probably closer to the presumed position that
Brad DeLong (the next speaker) would take than David Autor’s.
Indeed, in
his opening statement DeLong supported the technology explanation although, since
he made this point after a long detour through his family history, it was not
too clear to me whether it still applied to the current situation and China in particular.
Paul Krugman
(the statements were made in alphabetical order), referred to the similar TT discussions
in the 1990s where the consensus was that some 2/3 or more of the job and wage
effects were due to technology. But, Krugman said, economists might have been
right on trade’s limited role then; yet keeping the same opinions now was wrong
since the boost in trade that has occurred in the past 20 years was much
greater than what the US witnessed in the 1990s. He thought that trade today has
a massive impact but that it is one-off event, linked to China, and unlikely to
be replicated.
If soccer-like
I were to summarize the positions, I would say that Autor and Krugman were of the
opinion that “trade matters” while Harrison and DeLong tended to favor technological
explanation. But that classification is too rough. Autor’s own work, of which
he briefly spoke later, shows huge importance of technology, especially in displacing
routine labor. (My favorite
paper of Autor, Dorn and Hanson is the one which pits the trade vs.
technology stories against each other and finds that both…matter.) Similarly,
as I mentioned, Harrison does find incontrovertible impact of trade too.
There were
at least three areas where the panelists seemed to agree.
(1)
Withdrawing from globalization would be extremely costly for the US and the
world. DeLong pointed out to the asymmetric effects of NAFTA. While he argued
that NAFTA (trade with Mexico) had a miniscule impact on US job loss, withdrawing
from NAFTA today would have an enormous
negative impact because of the number and density of trade links that have been
established in the past two decades. Everybody agreed that it was madness to withdraw from globalization and to go back to protectionism.
(2) Everybody
agreed that economists underestimated the impact of trade. As Autor put it, the
benefits of trade (cheaper goods) are diffuse, but the costs are concentrated (aka
you lose your job). Krugman thought that this was because economists, enamored
by the “jewel in the crown of economics”, theory of comparative advantage, tend
to look at average effects, not at the heterogeneity of effects. He thought
that this was changing now.
On a more
philosophical note, Autor added that workers are people (yes) and that even if
the compensating mechanisms for job loss were effective (Ann Harrison said they
were not), people desire to have meaningful jobs and high wages rather than to subsist
on handouts.
(3) The China
effect will not reoccur. As I mentioned, the point was made by Krugman in the
opening statement, but was expanded on by both DeLong and Autor. DeLong thought
that China will be the last example of export-driven development, made possible
by the willingness of the US to be open to Asian imports (Japan and Korea
before) and by the eagerness of the rest of the world to cover US deficits by squirreling
the money in the United States. DeLong thus touched upon the global political
economy issues which paradoxically made the richest economy in the world be
capital importer rather than exporter. (Yet another example, in my opinion, of how
with globalization many of the nostrums of the mid-century neoclassical
economics got overturned.) But the one-off effect of China (no Indias, Ethiopias,
Burmas waiting in the wings) means that the current trade effects on US labor
are not going to be repeated.
It was a
great evening. The top economists in perhaps the hottest area of economic policy
dispute today duked it out in a very fair way,
and came out to a fairly consensual position. We are back to 1817 where
trade and technology (the famous Chapter XXXI) played such a great role in
Ricardo’s “Principles”.
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