Russia’s apocalyptic messianism

 

Having recently read Kropotkin’s memoirs (reviewed here), reminded me, in his description of intellectual history of Russian revolutionary movements, of Berdyaev’s book, “The origin and the meaning of Russian Communism”. Berdyaev wrote it in 1935-36; it was published in 1938. The only contemporary events referred to in the book are the Moscow trials (in one sentence), and a single mention of Hitler. The book presents an intellectual history of Russian revolutionary thought from the beginning of the 19^th century until the October Revolution, with an interpretation (relatively new at the time) of the Bolshevik policies.

 

Nassim Taleb has written that books that have been around for a  long time, are likely to remain with us for a long time.  If Plato is being read almost two-and-a-half millennia after he wrote, we can sure he  will be read in another two-and-a half millennia. The same is true for Berdyaev.  The book is, as I mentioned, ninety years old; I read it almost forty years ago. But it is still the book “d’actualité”. And has recently become more so.

 

The ideological background to the Russian thought is, according to Berdyaev, the belief in “apocalyptic messianism”. It is the subterranean ideology shared, Berdyaev writes, by Slavophiles, nihilists, anarchists and communists. Its main ingredient is a belief that, for some mysterious reason, Russian people (and that literally means “ordinary people”, peasants) has been selected to suffer and through its suffering to bring universal salvation to the world: “The mission of the Russian people is to realize social justice within human society, not just in Russia but in the entire world” (my translation). The salvation is accompanied by destruction.  The two elements, as in John’s apocalyptic writings, go together. There can be no salvation without the destruction of all that is false, rotten and built on lies. Apocalyptic thinking is, Berdyaev writes, the most important part of the Russian idea. It is characterized by asceticism, dogmatism, and acceptance (or perhaps, search?) of suffering.  

 

Berdyaev’s recounting of the 19^th century intellectual history has two objectives, I think. First, to situate Communist millenarism precisely within the doctrine of Russian messianism. The attractiveness of the Bolshevik revolution for the ordinary people in Russia was that it could be easily fitted into that age-old mold. The fact that the original belief was tightly linked with Christianity was not a problem. The same belief can be held with entirely different ideologies, even with an ideology like Marxism that is explicitly anti-religious. Somewhat tongue-in-cheek Berdyaev writes that Russia failed to become the Third Rome, but created the Third International. This leads Berdyaev to the discussion of the “russification” of Marxism, that “extreme Westernizing doctrine” when it appeared first in Russia.

 

The second objective is what may be of more interest today: the plasticity of apocalyptic messianism. We indeed hear of it almost daily, in a coarse form of threats of nuclear annihilation that are, it is averred, needed to preserve ‘conservative values” embodied by Russia. Berdyaev, himself a philosopher of Orthodox Christianity, does use class analyses throughout his discussion of 19^th century Russian ideological journey. Every messianism took place within given historical and social framework and appealed to different classes: Slavophiles found support among the clergy, high bureaucracy and the Court; anarchists were born in, and supported by, the parts of nobility and idealistic students; social-revolutionaries and the movement of “Black partition” (agrarian reform) relied on enfranchised peasantry; support for Bolsheviks was the strongest among impoverished intellectuals and national minorities.

 

Reading Berdyaev today thus necessarily raises the question, What classes are today the supporters of “apocalyptic messianism”, if there is indeed such a vision? We are not entirely sure that it really exists beyond somewhat crazed daily statements by the deputy head of the Security Council and a few TV commentators, but I do not think that its existence can be entirely discounted. Sergei Karaganov, in his recent writings, tries to give it some rationale by presenting Russia’s struggle (that is, its “messianism”) as built on two pillars: the creation of a polycentric world that much better fits the reality of political preferences today and is more egalitarian, and a struggle for “generally recognized” (conservative) values of family, religion, gender etc. Karaganov, being a political scientist and an international relation scholar, is much more at ease in bringing out the first element which indeed, I think, has much validity (the world cannot be ruled by a hegemon and be peaceful), although it is not clear how Russia by breaking international rules is contributing to them being observed by others. 

 

The second objective (“conservative values”) is dealt in only one sentence. “Objectify speaking”, there is nothing in that area that Russia can offer to the world, given that it exhibits some of the highest numbers for suicides, homicides, family violence, alcoholism and almost all other “generally recognized” social pathologies. Prudently, Karaganov avoids the topic.

But my question is, What social classes can support the version of “apocalyptic messianism” today? Russia’s social structure is entirely different from what it was in the 19^th century or in the period described by Berdyaev. Communist system has industrialized and urbanized the country. It has created a new ruling class, the red bourgeoisie, that has, when it conveniently decided to liquidate the system, become a true capitalist bourgeoise now, even an oligarchy. A large middle class of “technical” and “humanistic” intelligentsia has been created. The young and middle-aged market-dependent middle class has developed in many cities, even if its numbers are the highest in the two capitals. Aristocracy has been eliminated. Peasantry has shrunk. Thus, within the entire new social structure, it is not clear (at least not to me) who may be “the carriers” of the new apocalyptic messianism. It could be that what we hear are just the individual voices of anger or despair—not a reflection of a more deeply-seated ideology or class interests.  These are things which the contempories are not apt to judge well: history can prove that “apocalyptic messianism” has entirely lost its ideological hold on Russia, but, it is not impossible to believe that it is emerging right now under a different ideological form that we cannot fully grasp.