Monday, January 16, 2017

Trump and Gorbachev



The juxtaposition of these two names in the title may come as a surprise to many readers. What do a social-democrat who wanted to reform Communism, and the billionaire right-wing populist magnate have in common? Indeed, if we focus on their ideologies and individual histories (to the extent that they matter) nothing—not “almost nothing”, but “nothing”!

But if we look at the things from a structuralist perspective similarities are unmistakable.They do not believe in the hierarchical international systems they preside. They are part of the ruling elite but they are fighting against it.

Gorbachev came to power in 1985 planning to reform the Soviet Communism so that it could be economically more efficient and provide higher incomes for its people. The system whose head he became was a hierarchical one. Internationally, the countries of the “socialist camp” were organized in such a way that the USSR was their head; the USSR in turn was led but the Communist party. And the Communist party was led by its Secretary General. So, whatever the Secretary  General decided to do, the USSR did, and whatever the USSR wanted to do had to be acquiesced in or imitated by the “allies” or the satellite counties. In the words of a Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR in the 1950s, when the “weather” changed in Moscow, if it became colder, “we would all put on winter coats”;  if it got warmer, as with Khrushchev’s “thaw”, “we would all wear short sleeved-shirts”.

When Gorbachev came to power and started producing the noise that was entirely dissonant from whatever came from the Kremlin before, the Soviet and East European Communist elites were totally taken aback and paralyzed. Reforming the economic and political system and letting the Warsaw Pact countries “do it their own way” (the Sinatra song evoked by Gorbachev) were deeply troubling ideas directly antithetical to the elites’  power and to the ideological legitimation of their rule. But the elites could not imagine attacking the Secretary  General ‘s position because the Secretary General, not unlike the Pope, was supposed to be infallible. Torn between an obvious undermining of their rule and inability to mount a defense, they helplessly waited for the outcome, doing nothing. We know by now that the outcome was the dissolution of the Soviet Union, end of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and the end of Communism as a way to organize society.

The Western capitalist world was organized in 1945 in a similarly hierarchical fashion. The countries were “equal” but one was “more equal”.  In fact, were it not for the United States and the effort and money it expended in Europe and Japan, it is very unlikely that Europe and Japan would today look the way they do. On the top of the “more equal” country, sits its president. And while the US presidents have had their own idiosyncrasies (Carter was not Nixon), there were basic rules that they all observed: a close military and political union of culturally-similar, US-led democracies was never questioned. The Western elites, including in the United States, might have liked one president more than another (the European infatuation with Obama was quite extraordinary), but they felt safe that the essential architecture of the international system, created by the United States, will be defended by the United States.

With Trump who questions the modus operandi of NATO, the way that Gorbachev wondered about the need for the Warsaw Pact, that assurance is gone (or seems to be gone).  The EU is not sacrosanct either, nor is the WTO, nor the entire international architecture that the United States built from 1945 onwards.  

The elite in the West, like the Communist elites in the East some 30 years ago, are now at a loss. Aping or accepting the rhetoric emanating from Washington goes against the corpus of beliefs they have created and defended over the past 70  years. Yet opposing Washington, like opposing the Secretary General, Is out of the question because no similar system can be set up by a European power, nor by a combination of European powers. The Western elites treat Trump as they would treat a tiger with whom they are unwillingly locked in a cage: they try to be friendly to the tiger hoping to avoid being eaten, but they  hope that the tiger would soon be taken out of the cage.

Will Trump have a similarly devastating effect on democracies that Gorbachev had on Communism? I doubt it, because the Western democratic societies are more resilient and organic. If they are not, to use Nassim Taleb’s terminology, “anti-fragile” (i.e., thriving in chaos), they are at least robust. Communist societies, being hierarchical, were extremely brittle. Western societies have technocratic elites in power but these elites are subject to recall and they do have democratic legitimation. Further, capitalism unlike Communism is economically successful. There are very few people in France who would like to be ruled like China is ruled today; there were millions in Poland who craved to be ruled like France.

Trump will not, I think, destroy some essential structures of the Western system as it was built after the World War II, but he might, with his rough, chaotic and unpredictable government, scare the ruling elites in the West, encourage “revisionists”,  and bring about changes that will alter the world as it was created in Yalta and Potsdam.

Many people (myself included) have regretted that the Clinton administration has failed to seize the moment at the end of the Cold War to create a more just international order that would be based on the rules of law, would not be dichotomic or even Manichean one with its origin in the Cold War, and would include Russia rather than leave it out in the cold. Trump is unlikely to create a new structure but he can break parts of the old one.  If he does that, he might usher in a post-Cold War era, and close the book on 1945. But note that the Cold War had one good feature: it was “Cold”.

Sunday, January 8, 2017

Pareto, Taleb and the tails of income distributions



I am reading Nassim Taleb’s Antifragile and then I went back to rereading parts of his extraordinary Black Swan. The Black Swan’s blurb by Daniel Kahneman, “The Black Swan changed my view of how the world works” is fully justified. It will remain one of absolutely indispensable books, a huge epistemological advance. Antifragile is, perhaps, an even more ambitious book because it aims to make systems (including people) antifragile, that is thriving in conditions of (what Taleb calls) “opaque randomness”. So, it is broader in scope and has a  prescriptive part that The Black Swan  does not.
Here I would like to address one of the two themes of Taleb’s that find immediate resonance among people who work on income inequality and globalization: the former one. I  leave globalization for another post.
Taleb’s contribution here is absolutely crucial. Distributions that have long right-end tails, as distributions of income, and especially wealth, do, have both their mean values and inequalities heavily dependent on extremes. Moreover for the extreme events, as Taleb keeps on writing, standard deviations are all but irrelevant. So the distributions cannot be fully described by the mean and variance as we generally tend to do in inequality work. (If the variance, as Taleb writes, reflects lack of knowledge about the mean, then irrelevance of the variance implies lack of knowledge about the lack of knowledge, Rumsfeld’s “unknown unknown”.) 
Statisticians who work on inequality have long known, heuristically, how much our results, from Gini to Theil to income shares, depend on the extreme values, and they tried to “solve” this by getting rid of extremes by truncating the values above some maximum.  This so-called “top coding” was done until a few years ago by the US Census Bureau in its Current Population Surveys, the prime source of income distribution data for the United States, and a methodological primer for many other countries. Since household surveys are random samples, the idea was not to let extreme values that may be sampled in one year, but  not in many others, “unreasonably” affect both the mean and inequality statistics. For example, if you surveyed Bill Gates this year but never before and never again (which is  very likely since people with his wealth are extremely rare), this year’s US mean income and  inequality will turn out extremely high. You would then have hundreds of research papers and doctoral dissertations written about what special economic policy made US inequality shoot up while, of course, the true reason was the sampling.
Nassim is a big fan of power laws that apply to the distributions after a certain point (“crossover point”). This too has been used in practice by combining lognormal distributions that would hold up to a certain (high) income level with a Pareto, power law, distribution that would hold afterwards. (A distribution follows the Pareto law if for every x percentage increase in income, there is αx decrease in the percentage of recipients of such high incomes. α is the Pareto “constant”.) Alternatively, some people (most notably Viktor Yakovenko here) have combined exponential and Pareto distributions: the first would be a distribution that applies to wage earners (the bottom 95% of the population), the second, to capitalists (the top 5%). Anwar Shaikh in his monumental Capitalism used that “combined” distribution to discuss the relationship between income inequality and financial crises.
But where I part ways with Nassim is on the constancy of the α, which is implied in Mandelbrot’s fractile approach on which Nassim builds. I am not writing here about Pareto’s idea of constancy of α across places and time. This has been disproved enough (to see how empirical distributions look, pl. check my earlier post on Pareto, here). I am writing about the empirical fact that when we look at income distributions, depending on what part of the top we consider, α changes. I was interested in this several years ago, did quite a number of runs on empirical distributions, but never followed this up. What I did was to plot a relationship ln H(y) = A –α ln y where H is the inverse cumulative distribution, y = income, α = Pareto “constant” or “guillotine” (because it “cuts” the number of recipients as income is raised), over gradually smaller parts of the top: first for the top 20%, then for the top 19%, then for the top 18% etc. all the way to the top 1%.  I do not expect that the guillotine would stay equally steep.
In some cases the slope of the line may be negative (= α increases in absolute terms) if the distributions near the very top tend to be more “rarefied” than the distributions across the entire top 20%.  As shown in Figure below, this is the case of the United States. If you have only 100  people with incomes above several hundred million dollars, then increasing the threshold by (say) 10%, would make perhaps 20 or 30 of them fall below the new threshold. In the middle, very “dense”, part of income distribution, you can increase the threshold by 10% and very few people, percentage-wise, will drop out: perhaps only 1%. So, around the top, the guillotine would be -2 or -3, in the middle it would be -0.1.


But in the cases of Germany and the UK, whose distributions look almost identical except for the top 1%, the Pareto guillotine becomes less in absolute amount as we approach the top. The distribution around the top is more dense.      

In other cases, like Egypt, shown in the graph below with Italy and the same data for Germany, the Pareto constant is lower (in absolute amounts) almost throughout the entire top 20%. Egypt’s distribution is “denser” than German and Italian (almost) throughout. Weirdly, Italy comes closest to what Pareto would have believed.


The key point is that the power law works with unequal intensity even over the portion of the distribution where we believe it should apply (that is, above the “crossover point”). Thus in the equation above, we should write α(y) rather than a plain α.
The difference in the levels of the guillotines between Egypt and Germany/Italy illustrates another point: less sharp guillotines (if they were to hold throughout the entire distribution) like Egyptian will be associated with higher overall inequality because they imply thicker tails. Sharper guillotines imply less thickness in the tails and thus less inequality. This is expressed in the fact that Gini of a Pareto distribution is equal to 1/(2α-1) and that as α in absolute amount increases (i.e., distribution gets rarified), Gini goes down.
Where does it leave us? At a modified fractal approach: as we slice income and wealth distributions further and further, the same phenomenon does not repeat itself  with equal intensity but, depending on the distribution, with greater or lesser intensity. The Pareto constant varies so much that one wonders how the term “constant” can be applied to it at all.