In one of his rare discussions of inequality, Joseph
Schumpeter illustrated in a metaphor the difference between the inequality we
observe at a moment in time and social (or inter-generational) mobility. Suppose,
Schumpeter writes, that there is a multiple-story-high hotel with higher floors
containing fewer people and having much nicer rooms. At any given moment, there
would be lots of people on the ground floor living in cramped small rooms, and just
a few people in the nice and comfortable top-floor rooms with a view. But then
let the guests move around and change the rooms every night. This is what, Schumpeter said, social mobility will
do: at every given moment of time there are rich and poor but as we extend the
time period, today’s rich are yesterday’s poor and vice versa. The guests from
the ground floors (or at least their children) have made it to the top, those
from the top might have tumbled down to the bottom.
Now, Schumpeter’s metaphor was for a
long time a metaphor for US inequality too. It was granted that in the 20th,
and even in the 19th, century US income inequality might have been greater
than inequality in Europe, but it was also held that US society was much more
fluid, less class-bound and that there was greater social mobility. (That view
of course conveniently overlooked the huge racial divide in the US.) In other
words, inequality was the price that America paid for high social mobility.
This was a reassuring picture consonant with the idea of the American
dream. But was it true? We actually never knew it, beyond
anecdotal evidence of migrants’ lives, since no consistent empirical studies of
inter-generational mobility existed until very recently. But before I go to
their findings, I would like to focus in
very simple terms on the relationship between inequality and
social mobility.
Consider a diagram classifying societies
according to social mobility and inequality. From the US example mentioned
above, we would place US in the <high
inequality, high mobility> quadrant. It is easy to imagine <high inequality,
low mobility> societies: feudal societies will be one extreme example but all
societies with high income differences and entrenched power of the elites would
fall into that category too. So, let us write in Latin America or Pakistan in
the SE quadrant. It is also relatively easy to imagine what countries we would
place in <low inequality, high mobility> quadrant: probably Nordic countries
with strong public education that allows high inter-generational mobility while
redistribution of current income ensures low inequality.
It is much more difficult to find
examples of <low inequality, low mobility> societies. It seems somewhat
natural to think that if a society exhibits low inequality, it will be hard to
keep sons and daughters of people who have just a slightly lower income (than
another group) permanently below incomes of sons and daughters of that latter
group. One can even wonder what mobility in these cases really means: if
incomes between people and classes differ by an infinitesimal amount and your
children remain richer by that infinitesimal amount above mine, I am not sure
that that kind of lack of social mobility really matters much. Perhaps some
guild-like societies where occupations cannot be freely chosen but income differences
between the occupations are small could be placed in that category. Communist societies
had some aspects that could make them (weak) candidates to be placed in North-East
quadrant.
High social mobility
|
Low social mobility
|
|
Low income inequality
|
Nordic countries
|
Guild-like societies
Communist ?
|
High income inequality
|
US (American dream)
|
Latin America
Pakistan
|
So now that we have organized our thinking,
let us consider the empirical evidence. Most famously, it comes from the recent work
of Miles Corak, building on previous studies by Gary Solon, Blunden, Gregg and Macmillan, Björklund
and Jäntti and others. What these
authors find is that there is a strong correlation between current and inter-generational
inequality, or in other words, between inequality and low social mobility: the
more unequal the society the less likely is the next generation to move upwards
(or conversely, the less likely is the decline of the rich). So in terms of our
simple diagram, Corak finds that societies are aligned along the diagonal:
there are no outliers, whether the societies exhibiting the American dream or
the guild-like ones.
The implication of that finding which
was dubbed by Alan Krueger the Great Gatsby curve is that there is no American exceptionalism.
The comforting picture of high inequality which does not impede mobility between
generations turns out to be false. US does not behave any differently than
other societies with high inequality. High income inequality today reinforces income
differences between the generations and makes social mobility more difficult to
achieve. This is also the point of my
recent paper with Roy van der Weide. We use US micro data from 1960 to 2010
to show that poor people in US states with higher initial inequality experienced
lower income growth in subsequent periods).
This important finding that the actually
existing societies (as opposed to the dreamed up ones) are aligned along the
diagonal of our table has two important implications: (1) American exceptionalism in the matters of
income distribution does not have a basis in reality, and (2) we can use, with
a good degree of confidence, the easily available data on current inequality as
predictors of social mobility. Thus one cannot argue that societies with high inequality
in incomes are societies with high equality of opportunity. On the contrary, observed
high income inequality today implies low equality of opportunity.
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