Fernand Braudel wrote several smaller (in size) books that
dealt with his favorite themes of capitalism and the Mediterranean. One of
them is “Out of Italy” (or in the French original, “Le modèle italien”). Neither title is ideal because it does not convey
what the book is really about. It is about the leading role that the “Italian”
culture, architecture, trade, banking, poetry, music and science played in
Europe between 1450 and 1650. “Italian” has to be put between quotes because it
includes not Italy, a political unit which of course did not exist then, but
cities like Venice, Genoa, Florence, Naples, Pisa, Rome, Milan. What the French
call, “le génie italien”.
About three quarters of the book is a description of an
incredible efflorescence of the Italian cities that, by exporting their
savoir-faire from banking to opera transformed Europe and the world. Braudel details
the Italian intellectual hegemony over Europe, especially so in architecture
and painting. A discussion of how the baroque “out of Italy” came to dominate
Europe is minute, replete with hundreds of names (or which I think I knew at best 10 percent), and encompasses history
of Europe from England to Cyprus. One gets the feeling that Braudel is at times
writing a tedious homework whose objective is to persuade every doubting Thomas
of the extraordinary cultural rayonnement of Italy. It is not the part of the
book that plays to Braudel’s strengths.
There are parts that, depending on one’s interests, the
reader is likely to find either more or less interesting, boring or exciting. I
was overwhelmed (or bored) by architectural details or developments in
painting; but I found the description of the evolution of the “commedia dell’arte” fascinating.
Other readers might feel exactly the reverse.
But Braudel, the economic historian, comes to his own territory
only in the last fifty pages where he addresses, alas too briefly, two big questions:
why did Italy decline after 1650, and what is the relationship between economic
success and cultural rayonnement?
Braudel dismisses the explanation of the Italian “demise” that
is based on the success of Counter-Reformation. According to this view, the battle
to contain Protestantism needed all energy possessed by the Papacy and Italy, and
the external success in damming the forces of Lutheranism had to be paid for by stifling the internal forces of “reason” as shown by Galileo’s trial, Giordano Bruno’s execution, and the first practice
of book burning. Italy was the victim of its Catholicism. This is somewhat akin
to what many autocratic regimes do: destroy domestic dissent in order to solidify
its own ranks and win external victories. Braudel rejects this explanation by claiming
that North European approach to free thinking was not more tolerant than that
of Italian Catholics. He is similarly dismissive of Max Weber’s attempt to
establish a link between Protestantism and capitalism. Capitalism existed from
at least the 13th century Venice and Genoa. It was not invented by Calvinists.
The root of the Italian “demise”, according to Braudel, was in “decadence” where sturdier, hungrier,
more hard-working, poorer Northerners, the Dutch, and later the
British, encroached first on the Italian city-states’ monopoly of the Mediterranean
trade and afterwards displaced Italian traders from the Atlantic. In Braudel’s reading
of history, this was not a “natural” displacement driven by Northern European better
geographical position vis-à-vis the Americas. One could travel from
Genoa to the Americas as easily as from Amsterdam. But the Dutch outplayed the
Italians and the Spanish, especially after they obtained the control of the shipping
routes between the Mediterranean and the North Sea, in the same way in which
the Italians outplayed the Arabs earlier. Arabs too were richer, but grew
conceited and self-absorbed, and their trading posts in the Mediterranean were
taken one by one by the Italian city-states. Similar was the fate of Italy five
centuries later at the hands of North Europeans.
As they were losing a shipping battle, the Italian
city-states were also losing the industrial battle: “What happened to Italy was
a long, catastrophic industrial crisis followed on the heels of a long, catastrophic
shipping crisis” (p. 266). But Italian bourgeoisie was wealthy: what did they
do? They invested: “money was taken out of national circuits to be invested in whatever
foreign government loans looked promising” and in the agricultural production in
nearby lands. Rich Italians became gentlemen farmers and rentiers, no longer merchants
and industrialists. As Bas van Bavel has recently argued in “The Invisible
Hand?” (reviewed here), the financialization of the economy spelled the doom of
Italy. It was wealthy but it was producing less and less, its fleets shrinking,
its industrial output declining.
Braudel asks the question: suppose that an economist from the
21st century with full knowledge of what happened between 1650 and now
had to advise Italian city-states of the 17th century what to do. He
could have never convinced “the Venetian patricians to go back into shipping when
they were making profits of 100 percent of their agricultural land” and similarly
on lending. “The learned [economic] doctor would have been treated to the gales
of laughter” (p. 267).
Similarities with today’s heavily financialized and “outsourced”
economies of the Northern America and Western Europe are glaring. Braudel does
not mention them, perhaps out of good taste, or perhaps because the book was
written in the early 1980s when the roulette economy of the West was not as prominent
as today.
How about Braudel’s original theme of cultural influence and intellectual
grandeur? He sees them as being spawned by economic decadence. The stages of
economic decline produce cultural flowering. As his last sentence in the
book says, “night fell at least twice in Italy, first in about 1450, then again
in about 1600. The sky of the whole of Europe was lit by it.”