Avner Offer and Gabriel Söderberg (“The Nobel factor: the
prize in economics, social democracy and the market turn”) look at the
strange death of social democracy at the hands of market liberalism. That death
was accelerated by the role of the Nobel prize in economics that conferred to
economics an allure of science and that was used to much greater profit by neoliberal
economists to push for their version of economic policies.
Offer and Söderberg define social democracy as a continuation
of Enlightenment: from equality before God to equality before law, to equality
between men and women and races, to equality of entitlements between citizens. Since
each citizen goes through periods of dependency (as a child, as a mother, as unemployed,
or as an old person) when he/she cannot earn an income, he has to depend on
transfers from the working age population. This life-cycle pattern is shared by
all, and thus society, in a form of social insurance, sets a system that provides
redistribution from the earners to the dependents.
How does market liberalism solve the life-cycle problem? By
positing that everyone is a free agent with his endowments of capital and
labor. When he cannot work, he uses the proceeds from his capital (assuming of course
that he originally either inherited or saved enough wealth to have a capital). It
is not a “society” in a true sense of the word, but a group of “agents” who
manage own income over the life-cycle. Since returns are to one’s ownership of
labor and capital and there is no redistribution, it is a “just world” society
where one gets back what he has put in, and where income inequality is never an
issue—precisely because income is exactly proportional to one’s contributions.
These are indeed two different views of the world. As Offer and
Söderberg write, social democratic view was extremely successful empirically but
was not theoretically worked out much by economists. The neoliberal view has
exactly the reverse characteristics: empirically it was not much of a success
(look at private pension schemes in Chile), but economists have extensively
worked on it theoretically.
Neoliberal view
became dominant in the early 1980s as social-democratic model was blamed for
the slowdown in growth. The Nobel prize accelerated this shift because it
tended to favor neoliberal version of economics. The origins of the Nobel prize
are revealing in the same way that a look at the beginning of every great fortune
is revealing. There are there details that are better left unexplored. The
prize has all but been bought by the Swedish Central Bank (Riksbank) that had
the magnificent idea that a Nobel prize in economics can help it assert its independence
from the government by elevating economics to the position of a “science”. The Swedish
government let the Riksbank lobby with the Nobel Committee for the introduction
of the only prize not envisaged by Alfred Nobel, essentially as a vanity
project. The Riksbank prevailed upon the committee by, inter alia, removing some
constraints on the financial instruments in which the Nobel Committee could
invest and by funding the prize itself. It was a great example of
entrepreneurship: buy a prize for yourself. (One wonders if, for example, Apple
may not follow Riksbank and buy a prize to award for the most promising technological
development.)
There was, according to Offer and Söderberg, another reason
why social democracy was abandoned even by the parties that were brought into existence
through social democracy like British Labour, French socialists (SFIO) and German
SDP. The leadership of the parties passed from social activists and workers into
the hands of credential leaders who emphasized meritocracy and in whose eyes
redistribution rewarded the “underserving poor”. This is the background to Bill
Clinton’s “end of the welfare as we know it”, and Tony Blair’s New Labour. The
shift was also helped by the self-interest of the new leaders who in the process (as the Clintons and the Blairs show)
immensely enriched themselves. It could be even said that the parties were to some
extent hijacked by their self-interested leadership.
Offer and Söderberg do leave the door open to a possible return
of social democracy and see the harbingers of such a change in the increasing
role played by the left wings of the social-democratic parties as in the case
of Bernie Sander, Corbyn, Syriza and Podemos.
I find the Offer-Söderberg narrative largely persuasive but I
do have somewhat of a disagreement in that I think that the “objective” conditions
that played against social democracy are
not sufficiently emphasized. This is not only of an antiquarian interest. If the
objective conditions have indeed changed, as I believe, then the future appeal
of social democracy will also be more limited. In other words, we are unlikely
to return to a status quo ante even if the failure of neoliberalism is clear to
most (except perhaps to a few economists whose self-interest lies in denying
the obvious).
There are four such changes that I see which work against the
ideal-typical model of social democracy. (And some of them were mentioned at
the recent presentation of the book at the New School in New York.)
The first is multiculturalism. Social democracy was created
for ethnically and culturally homogeneous societies. West European societies
today are much more diverse than they were sixty years ago. This is the issue
on which Assar Lindbeck (incidentally, the
most influential person in the creation and early awards of the prize) has picked
early on. If cultural norms differ and if there is a “lack of affinity” between
the groups (to use Peter Lindert’s term) then willingness by some to fund transfers
for the others wanes.
The second challenge is the end of Fordism. With much more
heterogeneous labor, in terms of their skills and tasks; smaller size and
geographically dispersed units; the self-employed rather than workers, the
natural constituency of social democracy (homogeneous labor assembled in one
place) disappears.
The third challenge is demographic. Social democracy was very
successful through the use of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system in the countries
where population was increasing and the working age population was large. Many people
worked and they could transfer income to the retirees in the expectation that
the same deal will apply to them when they become old. But when the population
is in the decline and there are too many retirees compared to the working age population,
maintaining the integrity of the PAYG system is harder. It is not impossible as
the pension age can be raised and pensions reduced, but it is certainly not politically
easy to do.
The fourth challenge is globalization. Social democracy operated
within rather closed economies where
migration (and thus the challenge of multiculturalism) was minimal and where capital
was generally locked in nationally. None of that is true anymore. Capital is much more mobile, and if heavily taxed
to provide funds for social transfers, will flee. Developed welfare states that
make sure that nobody is left behind may provide incentives particularly to the
low-skilled migrants. Thus “better” social democracy may perversely attract
lower quality migrant labor than the much more austere and “mean” systems.
These, and perhaps a few other, elements seem to me to imply
that a return to the Golden Age of social democracy is unlikely to happen. On
the other hand, there is a realization of inadequacy of the neoliberal model
that bequeathed a huge crisis (which did not turn into another Great Depression
precisely because the key rules of neoliberalism were abandoned in order to
save the system). As many times in history, we are now at the point where
neither of the two established doctrines seems to provide reasonable answers to
today’s issues. That leaves the field open to new thinking and experimentation.